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Foreground liberalism, background nationalism: A discursive-institutionalist account of 
leverage and ‘democratic backsliding’ in newer EU members states * 
Over the last ten years key East-Central European (ECE) states within the European Union 
have experienced forms of democratic regression, often termed democratic ‘backsliding’. 
This has confounded earlier assumptions that democracy in ECE was – largely due to EU 
enlargement – well-anchored and secure. Existing literature on ECE backsliding has focused 
heavily on the actions of illiberal national-conservative governments in the two most 
problematic cases, Hungary (2010- ) and Poland (October 2015- ),and been framed in terms 
of how EU institutions and member states could or should respond to the challenge posed 
by such backsliding (Sedelmeier 2017; Pech and Scheppele 2017). 
In this article, we argue for a threefold change of emphasis in the debate on backsliding in 
ECE. First, we suggest, the unexpected seriousness of backsliding in ECE calls for a step back 
from immediate events to engage with institutional theory and the theoretical assumptions 
that have underlain accounts of democratic (and undemocratic) change in ECE. These, we 
argue, reflect predominantly rational- and historical institutionalist assumptions stressing 
direct incentives facing parties and voters and various putative ‘lock-in’ mechanisms 
stemming from EU accession and, subsequently, membership.  
                                                          
* We would like to thank Sherrill Stroschein, Anna Herranz Surralles, Jan Kubik and 
participants at the UACES 46th Annual Conference, 5-6 September 2016 and the ‘Eastern 
Europe’s New Conservatives” workshop at the Free University Berlin, 9-10 February 2017, 
for their comments and feedback on earlier versions of this paper, and three anonymous 





Second, we suggest prevalent rational- and historical institutionalist assumptions about 
consolidation, leverage and ‘backsliding’ (de-consolidation) in ECE can be supplemented by 
a theoretical approach that reinserts actors and their ideas in an institutional setting, the 
‘discursive institutionalism’ (DI) formulated by Vivian Schmidt (2008, 2010, 2011).  Third, in 
consequence of this change of institutional perspective, we argue for a shift in empirical 
focus.  Rather than focusing mainly on illiberal national-conservative governing parties in 
the most egregious cases, we suggest an additional focus on liberal mainstream pro-EU 
parties which, DI approaches imply, embody and give content to a liberal-democratic 
institutional settlement. We therefore test the potential weakness of democratic 
institutions by examining the discursive evolution of mainstream pro-EU parties in two 
relatively benign cases, where little backsliding has occurred: the centre-right in Bulgaria, 
and the centre-left in Czech Republic.  
We first review the literature on EU influence and democratic backsliding in ECE, 
highlighting their assumptions about the nature of actors and institutions.  We then 
highlight the potential benefits of a discursive institutionalist (DI) perspective. Next, we 
relate these ideas to outwardly liberal, pro-European political actors in Bulgaria and Czech 
Republic in pre- and post-accession periods, examining discourse on ethnic inclusivity to 
track commitment to a pluralistic liberal-democratic framework. In both cases we find that 
‘background ideas’ of ethnically-exclusive titular states increasingly impinged on 
‘foreground ideas’ of liberal pluralism.  
Our closing discussion reviews the implications of a DI perspective on ‘democratic 
backsliding’, which entails seeing illiberal political change in the region less as a turning 




process of shifting political discourses. We conclude by briefly mapping the policy 
implications of DI for EU policymakers currently grappling with democratic regression in 
ECE. 
 
Theorising democratisation and leverage in ECE 
Despite initially pessimistic expectations of democratic breakdown (Greskovits 1998), 
democratisation in ECE after 1989 was rapidly deemed a success story, with many accounts 
agreeing that EU influence had been decisive. Subsequent debate centred on when and 
where European Union influence had been strongest, and whether the EU had exercised 
greater influence by resetting incentives or working through a cultural ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ reshaping norms and identities using mechanisms like (elite) socialisation 
or social learning. Although disagreeing over the importance of structural and cultural 
preconditions1, most authors plumped for interest- and incentive-based frameworks, usually 
highlighting the EU’s pre-accession conditionalities and the leverage they afforded 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005, 2009, 2015; Epstein 2008; 
Dimitrova 2015; Börzel 2015; Börzel and Schimmelfennig 2017). Democratic conditionalities 
included broad ‘external incentives ... linked to the fundamental political principles of the 
EU, norms of human rights and liberal democracy, and the institutions of the market 
economy’ and the more specific political conditions of the ‘enlargement acquis’ relating to 
minority rights, regionalisation, and transparency and accountability in policy making 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, pp 210-12; citation p. 212).   Leverage was assumed 
                                                          
1 Epstein (2008, p. 203) argues there were preconditions (the West as a cultural model, consistent 
application of policy in existing member states) for leverage, while Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 




to play out both directly in governments’ reactions to conditionalities and indirectly by 
impacting and realigning electoral politics. In ECE states with a liberal ‘party constellation’ of 
pro-European forces, democratic conditionalities were generally accepted without demur 
or, for certain policies, after only limited resistance (Schimmelfennig 2009; see also 
Vachudova 2005, 2009, 2015). However, where strong illiberal ruling parties calculated that 
reforms would undermine their power, conditionality played out by empowering and 
reinforcing liberal opposition camps. In Vachudova’s influential account (2005, 2009, 2015), 
the ‘active leverage’ of accession conditionality – underpinned by the costs of potential 
exclusion - led to the displacement of illiberal nationalists and ex-communists by liberal pro-
European coalitions in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in ‘watershed elections’. The 
dynamic, as Vachudova (2005, p. 220; see also Schimmelfennig 2007) summarizes it, was 
that ‘the EU’s pre-Accession process provided strong incentives for all mainstream parties to 
change their political and economic agendas (if not their hearts and minds) to prevent their 
country from falling behind.’ Accounts of the apparent success of ECE democratisation were 
more eclectic in their explanations of how and why democratic institutions would endure. 
Very often, they invoked historical institutionalist (HI) notions of critical junctures, 
‘increasing returns’ and path dependent lock-in (Pierson 2000; Capoccia 2016).  Thus, 
Vachudova (2005; 2007, 2009) saw the coming to power of liberal reformers in ECE – either 
immediately after the fall of communism in 1989 or in ‘watershed elections’ in the late 
1990s – as a critical juncture which locked in a democratic path by bringing in liberal 
reforms, forcing nationalists and ex-communists to adapt and modernize, thus closing off 
alternative paths of development.  Other writers suggested – in line with mainstream 
theories of democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996; Schedler 1998) - a cultural lock-




because of a rationalist cost-benefit calculus to genuine ‘hearts and minds’ commitments 
based on a logic of appropriateness and identity change.  Thus, Schimmelfennig (2007, pp. 
39-40) for example, foresaw, that leverage would ‘reinforce and stabilize existing [liberal] 
norm conformance and create a virtuous circle’ (Schimmelfennig 2007, p. 39).  
 
Theorising ‘democratic backsliding’ 
Accounts of democratic lock-in, however, proved to be both too optimistic empirically and 
open to question in theoretical terms. At the empirical level, developments in Hungary and 
Poland suggested that the problem with democracy in ECE was no longer simply one of low 
democratic quality (see Roberts 2010) or weaker than hoped consolidation, but the erosion 
of democracy as a regime.  In bypassing, neutering or partifying countervailing institutions 
such as constitutional courts, public media, regulatory agencies and NGOs, illiberal 
governing parties were creating semi-authoritarian, hybrid regimes (Ágh 2016, Zgut and 
Przybylski 2017) - a textbook process of democratic backsliding through ‘executive 
aggrandisement’ (Bermeo 2016).  
Secondly, from the time democratic backsliding made itself felt in ECE with the advent of 
populist governments in Poland in 2005 and Hungary in 2010, it has been explained using 
the same theoretical frameworks previously used to account for the region’s apparent 
democratic success: as the product of (weakened or absent) EU incentives and (failed) path 
dependent lock-in. The main change made by analysts was to update or rethink their 
empirical assessments. Thus, the falling away of accession conditionalities - or their 
replacement with weaker, more cumbersome post-accession conditionalities such as the 




elites (and voters), making it less costly to turn to illiberal politics (Dimitrova 2015; 
Sedelmeier 2017). Similarly, ‘lock-in’ mechanisms such as oversight and monitoring 
institutions, it was suggested, had worked patchily, failing to generate ‘increasing returns’, 
because they were established tardily or incompletely due to unfavourable configurations of 
domestic forces or veto players (Sedelmeier 2012, pp. 35-36). Overall, in hindsight, 
backsliding experience in contemporary ECE seems to confirm the potential weakness of 
institutions as a ‘lock-in’ mechanism for democratic consolidation noted by both Bernhard 
(2015) and Alexander (2001), who argues that the costs of institutional change to ‘revision 
parties’ can be low and that social or electoral demands can trump even the best-made 
constitutional anchors. Accounts of backsliding also make use of the idea – common in 
historical-institutionalist writing – of exogenous shocks as a source of disruptive path-
breaking (equilibrium-upsetting) change.  If the collapse of Soviet-backed communist 
regimes was the initial exogenous shock triggering democratisation (Vachudova 2007), then 
the Great Recession, the strains on the Eurozone, or the European Refugee Crisis were 
triggers for backsliding, both impacting directly on ECE domestic politics and indirectly in 
inducing crises in the wider EU (Greskovits 2015).  
The backsliding literature has sometimes discussed ECE in cultural terms making explicit the 
unstated argument in earlier democratisation literature that the region’s democracy was 
potentially vulnerable because its politicians and electorates lacked liberal-democratic 
values.  Some accounts suggested that illiberal norms rooted in the communist (and pre-
communist) past were reasserting themselves or that a cultural shift was seeing ECE elites 
move away from liberal, Western-oriented norms (Gallina 2008), linked to the global rise in 
illiberal populisms.  In theoretical terms, however, such arguments are ambiguous.  It is 




illiberal cultures, or whether – in line with the so-called ‘sociological’ new institutionalism 
(discussed below) – political institutions needed to be re-conceived as having always been 
primarily expressions of identity. 
Such rationalist-cultural syntheses are an awkward theoretical amalgam. Moreover, they 
have proved a shaky guide to understanding the nature and durability of democracy in ECE 
empirically. Until mid-late 2000s the scholarly consensus was that ECE countries such as 
Hungary and Poland had built institutions comparable, but not equal in quality to, those in 
Western Europe (Ekiert, Kubik and Vachudova 2007, pp. 8-9, 12). Many concluded as early 
as the 1990s that democratic consolidation in these states had ‘passed by the point of no 
return’ making authoritarian reversal unlikely (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, p.580; see also Linz 
and Stepan 1996).  It is unclear then why backsliding should have occurred so rapidly in such 
supposedly consolidated democracies, why it appeared first and most forcefully in 
supposedly ‘liberal pattern’ states, where democratic leverage was apparently unneeded; 
and why parties previously included in the mainstream right, rather than ex-communists or 
radical outsider parties, should have been the main vehicles for backsliding.  
 
A discursive institutionalist perspective  
We believe that the ‘fourth new institutionalism’, the discursive institutionalist (DI) 
approach developed by Vivien Schmidt, may generate distinct insights into current 
processes of ‘backsliding’ and (de-)democratisation in ECE.  Although most commonly used 
to study policy-making because of the distinction it draws between ‘communicative’ (public) 
and ‘co-ordinative’ (technical) discourses, DI makes broader distinctive claims about the 




and Taylor 1996).2 DI’s defining claim is that institutions are not merely incentive structures 
that co-ordinate collective action (as in ‘rational institutionalism’), historically-anchored 
patterns of constraint (as in historical institutionalism) or embedded political-cultural 
formations (as in sociological institutionalism), but contexts of meaning that are constituted, 
re-constituted and changed by the discursive (inter-)action of social and political actors 
(Schmidt 2008, p. 314). Such actors, Schmidt holds, are reflexive (‘sentient’) and follow a 
‘logic of communication’, rather than the simple means-end logic of fixed preferences and 
interest maximisation (as in RI), a ‘logic of path dependence’ (as in HI), or a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ centred on embedded cultural norms as in sociological institutionalism (SI) 
(Hall & Taylor 1996; also Schmidt 2010, pp. 4-15).3 For DI, actors formulate (and re-
formulate) strategies, sometimes pragmatically, sometimes as committed ‘ideological 
entrepreneurs’ (Schmidt 2016, pp. 330-31; see also Kubik 2019 forthcoming), which not only 
make sense cognitively, but  also resonate in terms of norms and values that give them 
legitimacy in wider ‘meaning contexts’ (Schmidt 2010, pp. 14, 17-18; see also Schmidt 2008, 
pp. 309-313).  
The distinction that other institutionalisms render as one between (institutional) structure 
and agency is viewed in DI as a distinction between three levels of discourse: 1) policy level 
ideas, 2) programmatic (paradigmatic) ideas and 3) underlying (public) philosophies. Actors 
draw constantly on ‘foreground discursive abilities’ in political interaction, while taken-for-
                                                          
2 Given space constraints, we do not engage with the theoretical case for DI or debates between 
institutional theorists about DI’s potential and limitations. On this, see the exchange between Bell 
(2011) and Schmidt (2012) and Hay’s (2016) discussion. 
3 As Schmidt (2016, p. 319) notes ‘if actors behave in ways that correspond to RI, HI or SI 
assumptions (as they sometimes do) it is because these assumptions have achieved such dominance 




granted ‘background ideas’ underpin agents’ ability to make sense in each meaning context, 
in terms of the ideational rules or ‘rationality’ of that setting (Schmidt 2008, pp. 314; see 
also Schmidt 2010, pp. 15-17; Schmidt 2016). As well as having an objective existence, 
institutions are thus embodied in actors’ (shared) background ideas about them. However, 
actors’ ‘foreground discursive abilities’ also give them the ability to rethink and change (or 
maintain) institutions (Schmidt 2008, p. 314).  
As Schmidt (2010, p.314) puts it 
discursive abilities represent the logic of communication which enables agents 
to think, speak, and act outside their institutions even as they are inside them, 
to deliberate about institutional rules even as they use them, and to persuade 
one another to change those institutions or to maintain them. And it is because 
of this communicative logic that DI is better able to explain institutional change 
and continuity than the older three new institutionalisms. 
Although it can address continuity, DI has a bias for change and posits a social and political 
order where institutions are considerably less (enduringly) stable than in the accounts of the 
three more familiar new institutionalisms.  This makes DI well-attuned to analyse emerging 
processes of change such as ‘democratic backsliding’ and has distinct implications about 
how we might view such processes.    
Firstly, in viewing institutions as discursively constructed and maintained, DI is sceptical not 
only of the extent of rooted-ness of any institutional order, but also of the HI notion that 
periods of equilibrium or stasis are punctuated by decisive turning points, tipping the region 
(or countries within it) in a new direction. Rather, DI suggests that crises are discursively 




for example, Schmidt 2013, Moffitt 2016, Saurugger 2016, Hay 2016; Kubik 2019 
forthcoming). In this perspective, although political change may be faster or slower, the 
search for tipping points or critical junctures shifting ECE (or individual ECE countries) onto 
an illiberal path, or the exogenous shock of political, economic or migration crises triggering 
such junctures is misleading.  In this respect, DI assumptions align with sceptical 
perspectives in both regional democratisation and Europeanisation literatures: they imply, 
firstly, that the initial impetus towards consolidation in ECE was weaker than assumed and 
perhaps incomplete (Dawson and Hanley 2016);  and secondly, that EU democratic 
conditionality was always something of a chimera, sustained by the shared interests of 
domestic and EU elites in maintaining a ‘myth of conditionality’ (Hughes, Sasse and Gordon 
2007; see also Haughton 2007; Kochenov 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi 2014).  The predominant 
framing of the ECE’s democratic difficulties – including now obvious democratic regression 
of some states -  as ‘de-consolidation’ or ‘backsliding’ on substantial earlier democratic 
progress is questionable.  
Secondly, a DI approach implies that in ECE it is domestic social and political actors, who are 
the ultimate agents of change and stability in liberal-democratic institutions.  This is most 
evident in the discourse of a national-conservative incumbents such as Hungary’s Viktor 
Orbán, whose speeches envisioning an ‘illiberal state’ show precisely how illiberal actors can 
‘think, speak, and act outside ... institutions even as they are inside them’ and in so doing 
change those institutions. However, in DI it is arguably the elite discourses of the self-styled 
liberal mainstream that hold the key to how democratic institutions function and whether 
they endure.  The role of the ’liberal’ or ‘reformist’ ECE elite, as makers and hands-on 
implementers of ‘reform’ trajectories is noted in many conventionally-framed accounts of 




Vachudova 2005, 2009, 2015). However, in such accounts after these elites have performed 
the historic task of switching their countries to a liberal path after 1989, little attention is 
paid to their agency, especially their discursive agency.  Instead, the analytical heavy lifting 
is carried out by examining the EU’s incentive structures (and hoped-for path dependent 
lock-in) and the design of domestic institutions (Tomini 2015). DI implies that, rather than 
being merely the (recalcitrant) subjects of institutional incentives, path dependent lock-in or 
socialization mechanisms, domestic actors, their understandings of themselves and their 
environments are key to how (democratic) institutions will be constituted (or de-
constituted).  
Taken together, these insights suggest that we need 1) an analytical focus extending over a 
longer period than just a critical election bringing (or not bringing) an illiberal governing 
party to power and its aftermath and 2) also to consider the discourse of key actors 
identified by the EU and by the literature as ‘liberal reformers’, whose (assumed) role lies in 
publicly validating formally liberal-democratic institutions, giving them substance and 
solidity; and 3) that it is the discourse and discursive shifts of mainstream liberal parties that 
provides a key indication of the (de)consolidation or regression of liberal-democratic 
institutions. 4    
 
Minority rights as a touchstone of (il)liberalism 
                                                          
4 We take ‘liberal’ to mean not only forces that identify with liberal philosophies, but a range of 
mainstream ideologies of left and right based on shared commitments to norms of political equality, 




To discuss these issues concretely, we focus on the discursive positioning of two key liberal 
pro-European mainstream parties in two countries, Bulgaria and Czech Republic, in relation 
to minority rights. Although a DI perspective could be applied to illiberal actors and 
institutions in countries which are already deep into democratic regression, we focus on 
these states because they are ‘benign’ cases where no strong overtly illiberal forces had 
emerged and where there has been no sustained, successful power grab. Although we are 
not using the classic case-comparative method, our logic is broadly that of ‘least likely’ cases 
(Gerring 2007: pp. 116-119): if we find illiberal underpinnings or illiberal drift in self-
presented pro-European mainstream parties in countries where significant backsliding has 
not occurred, we may reasonably infer that this could be a wider phenomenon.  
Minority rights – regulating the inclusivity/exclusivity of the political community -  is chosen 
as one of the earliest elements of the EU’s democratic conditionality, and was prominent in 
both the 1993 EU Copenhagen criteria and the EU’s democratic acquis. All 2004-7 ECE 
accession states except for Poland and Slovenia had significant Roma populations or 
sizeable, territorially-concentrated national minorities. 
Liberal democracies can meet the claims of ethnic and national minorities in various ways, 
some more far reaching than others (Deets 2004) and culturally conservative expressions of 
majority identities need not exclude recognition of minority rights. Nevertheless, ethnic 
inclusivity provides a good test of congruence with the core liberal democratic norm of 
pluralism and can signal much about approaches to liberal checks and balances in general. 
Where ethnic minority voices are curtailed, the door is left open for other interests and 




the idea of distorting the democratic playing field by stripping away institutional checks and 
balances of constitutional liberalism thinkable, acceptable, even necessary.  
We now turn to our two case studies. In the Europeanization literature, Bulgaria appears as 
a ‘successful laggard’ (Bechev and Noutcheva 2008).  The country’s post-1989 politics were 
initially dominated by the staunchly illiberal ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). 
However, EU accession conditionalities appeared decisive in averting a BSP-led relapse into 
authoritarianism by boosting a self-styled liberal pro-European camp, whose main vehicle 
was the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) (Vachudova 2005, pp. 220). By the time the UDF 
was unexpectedly defeated in 2001 all major parties, including the BSP, had committed to 
the ‘liberal consensus’ (Krastev 2007) of free-market economics, and EU and NATO 
membership.  
The Czech Republic, by contrast, was seen as a leader in post-communist democratization. 
In the literature, it thus fits as a ‘liberal pattern’ state where the strong domestic liberal 
actors were enough to drive democratization, with EU influence restricted to problem areas, 
but fading out as accession became near certain (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; 
Vachudova 2005, 2009).  As the electoral fortunes of the Eurosceptic free-market Civic 
Democrats (ODS) waned from mid-1990s, Czech accession was overseen by a government 
led by the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), a party squarely in the liberal-democratic 
mainstream, without ties to former ruling Communists, and unambiguously pro-integration.  
Illiberalism by omission?  The ‘titular state’ as background idea 
In a context defined by EU Accession, the public (‘communicative’) discourse of liberals in 
both states framed ratification of the minority rights acquis as part of the broader project of 




Conscious of external EU oversight - and the need to keep public pronouncements aligned 
with their ‘co-ordinative discourse’ to EU policymakers and officials - mainstream liberal 
incumbents kept ethnopolitical debates off the domestic political agenda by making no 
mention of them or by delegitimising minority interests on plausibly liberal individualist 
grounds.  They did so, we argue, because of the resilience of the ‘background idea’ of what 
we call the ‘titular state’, a prevailing understanding of the national state as the property of 
the ethnic community from which it derives its name/title, the purpose of that state being 
to further the interests of this titular ethnic majority5. This continued to ‘set the limits of the 
imaginable’ (Schmidt 2016, p.318) with respect to policy choices.  In both cases, in line with 
Schmidt (2016, p. 323), we infer the (limiting) nature of the ‘titular state’ background idea 
by ‘working backwards’ from actors’ more specific, lower-level policy- and politics-related 
statements and actions.  
 
Bulgaria’s Centre-Right UDF Government 1997-2001 
Bulgaria’s pro-European liberal centre-right decisively gained government office in 1997 as 
the ex-communist BSP administration struggled with a dire economic situation and mass 
protests. In 1996-7, the UDF’s future prime minister Ivan Kostov outlined his government’s 
philosophy of the ‘civilizational choice’. The ‘civilization’ referenced was, naturally, that of 
‘Europe’, or more broadly, ‘the West’, explicitly framed as embracing EU and NATO 
membership and rejecting the BSP’s alleged Russophile leanings.   
                                                          
5 This comes close to Brubaker’s (1996) idea of the ‘nationalizing state’. However, our term stresses 




This pro-European ‘civilizational choice’ discourse did not explicitly extend to greater ethnic 
inclusivity. In the 1997 election campaign the party did drop the ethnic nationalist and anti-
Turkish tropes previously used in tandem with its BSP opponents (Ragaru 2001, pp. 302-7). 
In power, the UDF was, unlike the previous BSP administration, prepared to make 
liberalising institutional changes. The Framework Convention on the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM), which formed part of the acquis, was ratified in 1999; limited Turkish-
language instruction in schools was introduced; and airtime was given over for Turkish-
language news on state television.   
Yet the UDF also followed a strategy of keeping references to ethnopolitical debates out of 
their communicative discourse (Vachudova 2005, p. 202) and keeping formal institutional 
change strictly limited. Contradicting the signal sent by ratification of the FCNM, the UDF 
government ‘cut the salaried staff of the National Council for Ethnic and Demographic 
Affairs, the only government agency dealing with ethnic minorities’ (Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee Report 1999, pp. 13-14).  
A more significant omission was the UDF’s reluctance to address part of the Bulgarian 
constitution that gravely constrained – and still constrains - the expression of ethnic 
minority interests: clause 11.4 has since 1991 forbidden parties ‘formed on an ethnic or 
religious basis’. Despite the plausibly civic phrasing, this clause was only ever designed to be 
used against minority parties. Several small (mainly Macedonian) parties have been banned 
– including during the UDF administration - while the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, 
representing the bulk of ethnic Turkish voters (9 per cent of the electorate), had narrowly 
survived attempts to ban it (Ganev 2004, Rechel 2007). Throughout the UDF-led 
administration, the MRF continued to exist under the shadow of prohibition and only then 




Indeed, the UDF was still cautiously competing for anti-Turkish votes while in office.  The 
party and its leaders found ways to attack and de-legitimize the MRF using a liberal 
discourse. Central to Kostov’s programme, for example, were denunciations of MRF leader 
Ahmed Dogan as ‘a curse on Bulgaria’ on the grounds that the MRF kept ethnic Turkish 
voters dependent on patronage (Borden 2005). The liberal discourse of a European 
‘civilizational choice’ was also deployed for the purposes of exclusion. For example, Kostov 
in 2000 argued that the country’s ‘Oriental legacy’ ought to be jettisoned once Bulgaria 
returned to Europe (De Dominicis 2011, p. 450) – an ambiguous comment that could be 
understood equally as calling for a modernized liberal Bulgaria or suggesting that Muslim 
and Turkish minorities embodied backwardness and were outsiders to the national project 
of liberal Europeanization.  
 
The Czech centre-left 1998-2006   
In the Czech Republic, as in Bulgaria, a liberal mainstream pro-European governing party, 
the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD), drove the fulfilment of formal requirements of the 
acquis. Like the Bulgarian liberals, ČSSD (and other mainstream Czech parties) saw accession 
as part of a civilizational choice: a ‘return to Europe’ re-asserting pre-communist liberal 
national traditions. The Czech Republic had no sizeable, territorially-concentrated national 
minorities equivalent to Bulgaria's ethnic Turks.  However, two issues of identity and 
inclusion arose during accession which highlighted the boundaries of mainstream Czech 
liberalism:  the rights of the Roma and, to a lesser extent, the unresolved historical debates 




The treatment and status of the Roma minority, estimated at 2-3 per cent of the population, 
threw Czech self-perceptions into sharp relief, functioning in President Havel's words as ‘a 
litmus test of civil society' (cited in Fawn 2001, p. 1195). This was also a focus of concern for 
the EU during accession. Through Social Democrat(-led) governments spanning 1998-2006, 
Czech public policy accepted the need for targeted programmes to equalize the position of 
Roma, with the ‘coordinative discourse’ of policymaking embracing ideas such as inclusion 
and cultural diversity (Fawn 2001; Ram 2012).  However, the Czech Social Democrats like 
Bulgaria’s liberals maintained a communicative discourse largely silent on minority rights.  
As in Bulgaria, when they did engage with minority issues, they tended to do so on liberal 
individualist grounds (‘the civic principle’) to deny group claims of minorities. Successive 
Social Democrat party programmes from the 1990s made no mention of the Roma or 
minority rights, focusing on general questions of economic and social development. When 
the issue was forced on to the national political agenda by EU criticism or racist violence, the 
Social Democrats presented the claims of the Roma minority and anti-Gypsyism as political 
and electoral problems to be managed – and kept off the political agenda - rather than 
challenged.   
The post-war 'transfer' (odsun) of Czechoslovakia’s 3 million strong Sudeten German 
minority had already been subject of a divisive samizdat debate in 1980s, periodically 
emerging as a political issue after 1989 as questions of historical responsibility, property 
restitution and relations with Germany arose.  Liberal former dissidents and Christian 
Democrats saw the odsun as a mass abuse of human rights and project of ethnic cleansing, 
which had paved the way for communist totalitarianism. However, Social Democrats (and 




liberal norms, the 'transfer' was a historical fact and part of a settlement that re-founded 
the Czechoslovak (hence the Czech) state. 
Taken together, these ambiguities and silences of liberal, pro-European parties reveal that 
their liberalism was constructed with an in-built bias to maintaining the existing ethnic 
hierarchy. It reflected a resilient and usually implicit background idea shared among all 
mainstream Bulgarian or Czech parties: that a fundamental purpose of the state was to 
advance the interests of the titular majority nation and that this defence could, in certain 
circumstances, trump liberal-democratic norms. Such omissions in the ‘civilizational’ pro-
Western discourse of pro-EU reformers would later morph into explicitly illiberal responses 
to developments such as the European Refugee Crisis. 
 
Illiberal by commission: Foregrounding the ‘titular state’ in times of crisis 
In more recent times in both Bulgaria and the Czech Republic the titular state background 
idea has been foregrounded by parts of the (erstwhile) liberal mainstream seeking to think 
through and define the nature of social and political challenges in a changed domestic and 
European environment.   A decade on from accession, discourses of ‘returning to Europe’ 
were less compelling.  Mainstream liberal ECE politicians could no longer easily present 
themselves as constrained by EU conditionalities or pitch themselves to voters as the EU’s 
preferred accession partners. The EU struggled to respond coherently to either the 
Eurozone crisis or the European refugee crisis and the East-West gap in EU wages and living 
standards appeared entrenched. 
Both our case studies highlight a shift in the communicative discourse of some liberal actors 




to foreground this idea, melding pro-EU liberal constitutionalism with illiberal norms. In the 
Bulgarian case, this has involved UDF’s successor bloc openly scapegoating ethnic 
minorities, though without explicitly rejecting liberal constitutionalism. Some Czech social 
democrats went further, arguing for the need to avoid the ‘mistakes’ of Western Europe 
about migration and multiculturalism and suggesting that the social democratic left should 
instead embrace the idea of Fortress Europe.   
 
The illiberal drift of the Bulgarian centre-right 2013-2015 
When Bulgaria faced its first parliamentary elections as an EU member in 2009, the Union of 
Democratic Forces had long been supplanted as the main centre-right force. In its place 
stood the Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), a personal party which 
traded on the popularity of celebrity Mayor of Sofia Boiko Borisov, mixed neo-liberal fiscal 
orthodoxy, the open embrace of Bulgarian ethnic nationalism (Nancheva and Koneska 2015) 
and patronage politics.  GERB was forced from office in February 2013 by protests driven by 
impoverished pensioners and rural citizens enraged by the party’s links with energy 
companies which had hiked winter fuel prices.  The subsequent decision of BSP-backed 
caretaker prime minister Plamen Oresharski to appoint 32-year-old media baron Delyan 
Peevski to head Bulgaria’s national security apparatus in May 2013 brought Sofia’s middle-
class, including many younger, more highly-educated citizens, to the streets, seemingly 
signalling a renaissance of pro-European liberalism. 
The appearance of an apparently battle-ready liberal civil society appeared to lend support 
to the notion that liberal reform may be ‘locked in’ even when illiberal elites were in office, 




socio- political crisis as a continuation of the struggle against a corrupt ‘Communist’ elite for 
democracy and liberal ‘European norms’. On 8 July 2013, the French and German 
ambassadors echoed this construction of the crisis in a joint statement of encouragement 
which proclaimed that ‘the oligarchic model’ of politics was not compatible with ‘civilized’ 
European norms’.6  
However, as in the Kostov-era, liberal protesters’ advocacy of ‘Europe’ and ‘democracy’ and 
maligning of ‘Communists’ was not accompanied by any shift towards a socially or ethnically 
inclusive vision of Bulgaria’s political and national community. First, alongside the explicit 
pro-Europeanism, the protests became a vehicle for those who sought to delegitimize the 
interests of the socially marginalized (Stoyanova 2016, p. 5).  Commentaries in right-leaning 
newspapers and NGO websites lauded the protests as the expression of ‘quality’ over 
‘quantity’ (Yanakiev 2013) and willed the ‘bourgeois’ to victory over an alliance of ‘oligarchs 
and the poor’ (Ganev 2013).  Second, when the protests were swelled by groups chanting 
anti-Turkish slogans against the MRF’s role in the Oresharski government, the dominant 
response of Sofia-based progressives was one of disapproval but no direct challenge, 
prompting some ethnic Turks to wonder whether the protests were also for them 
(Gyulestan 2013).  
When GERB returned to office following the October 2014 elections, it was, however, joined 
in coalition by the Reformist Bloc, a grouping containing the UDF’s successor parties, 
drawing support from the same highly-educated urban demographic that had driven the 
Sofia protests. While the protesters’ avoidance of ethnopolitical issues echoed the stance of 
                                                          
6 ‘France, Germany Urge Bulgarian Government to Cut Ties with Oligarchy’, 8 July2013, Novinite. 




the old UDF, the successor parties’ role in government suggested an overt discursive shift 
towards an ethnic exclusivist interpretation of Bulgarian pro-European liberalism. In early 
December 2014, Reformist Health Minister Petar Moskov announced that ambulances 
would not enter Roma ghettoes where medical staff allegedly risked attack7.  Justifying the 
measure, Moskov described Roma as populatsiya, a term usually applied to livestock. 
Moskov was unequivocally supported by party colleagues: the Reformist Bloc released a 
statement that rejected charges of xenophobia, reducing the issue to one of ‘compliance 
with the law.’8  
 
The emergence of an illiberal social democracy in the Czech Republic 
A decade after EU accession after a period of right-wing led government (2006-2013), the 
Czech Social Democrats again found themselves in office. However, the electoral support of 
the party – as well as those of its traditional rivals on the neo-liberal right - had declined as 
new anti-establishment movements focusing on anti-corruption made an electoral impact. 
On minority rights, much of its public/communicative discourse continued the pattern of 
'economising' minority claims within wider policies while allowing local politicians to indulge 
in overt 'anti-Gypsyism'. Positions on the Beneš Decrees, which periodically emerged onto 
the political agenda, also remained unchanged with suggestions by some Social Democrats 
                                                          
7 ‘Emergency Medical Teams Will Avoid Roma Districts unless their Safety Is Guaranteed’, 
Novinite.com, 7 December 2914. Available  
http://www.novinite.com/articles/165264/Emergency+Medical+Teams+Will+Avoid+Roma+Districts
+unless+their+Safety+Is+Guaranteed   Accessed 20 August 2017. 
8 ‘Moskov ne e ksenofob I fashist a iska da vudvori red’ Dnevnik.bg, 12 December 2014. Available 
http://www.dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2014/12/12/2437053_moskov_ne_e_ksenofob_i_fashist_a_iska_d




that the Czech Republic should apologise for the post-war 'transfer' immediately slapped 
down.9  
However, it was in their efforts to frame the European Refugee Crisis that changes in some 
Social Democrats’ views concerning the boundaries and nature of the national political 
community became most explicit.  A small number of the party's leaders, such as its 2013 
presidential candidate Jiří Dienstbier, wished the party to modernize by embracing a left-
liberal position, championing issues such as social inclusion of Roma, gay marriage and a 
more pluralistic, multicultural view of Czech identity.  However, other senior figures in the 
ČSSD leadership drew the opposite conclusions, and articulated an explicitly socially 
conservative vision of Czech social democracy – illiberal not just by omission, but by 
commission. In 2014, for example, Zdeněk Škromach, then one of the party's deputy leaders 
told an interviewer that ‘[I]f ČSSD concentrates on various minorities, supports positive 
discrimination for Roma and shuts its eyes to the fact that a problem does exist in this 
minority's behaviour, if ČSSD deals with lesbian and gay adoption, then it will lose elections 
like this’.  Škromach instead advocated ‘traditional social democracy’ and a 'back to basics' 
approach (vrátit ke kořenům) of appealing to a larger economic constituency of (white 
heterosexual) ‘employees, the self-employed, working people, families with children and 
seniors’ (Parlamentní listy 2014).  
However, the discourse of a culturally illiberal social democracy was clearest in the words of 
current President (and former ČSSD leader and prime minister) Miloš Zeman (and his 
supporters) in relation to the European refugee crisis.  Zeman argued that, although only 
                                                          
9   ‘Rouček jde kvůli omluvě za odsun Němců k Sobotkovi na kobereček’, Novinky.cz 5 June 2011. 
Available https://www.novinky.cz/domaci/236124-roucek-jde-kvuli-omluve-za-odsun-nemcu-k-




small numbers of refugees had entered its territory, the Czech Republic faced a potential 
'tsunami' of predominantly Muslim migrants threatening its culture and identity (Zeman 
2015a).  Although allying himself with conservative nationalists in Hungary and Poland on 
these issues – and supporting Donald Trump -   Zeman (2015b) sought to integrate his ideas 
with pro-European, social-democratic discourse, reasserting his support for European 
integration in economic and defence policy, and maintaining his longstanding commitment 
to a Swedish-style social model.  
Speaking at a conference in Slovakia on the future of Central European social democracy, 
Zeman (2016) told listeners that:  
 
Social democracy should defend national interests, should defend not only its 
own historical roots, but also those of European culture and should realize that 
this culture is incompatible with the culture of hatred towards non-believers and 
based on an attempt to subjugate the non-believers and enslave them... 
 
A more elaborated version of this position has been articulated by some intellectuals close 
to the party. The sociologist Jan Keller, who sits as a ČSSD MEP, for example, argued that 
'enforced solidarity'  through acceptance of large numbers of refugees would take place at 
the expense of the poorest citizens and would undermine the welfare state  Keller and 
Zeman’s argumentation develops the earlier trend in Czech social democracy to 'economize' 
issues of discrimination and minority rights - or present them as secondary to economic 
issues - and repackaged a narrow, exclusionary notion of national community as the defence 





Discussion and conclusions  
In this paper, we note how most accounts of democratic backsliding in ECE draw, implicitly 
or explicitly, on rationalist or historical institutionalist understandings of how institutions 
influence and shape actors or, in some circumstances, fail to do so.  The unstated 
assumption is that post-communist elites and publics, while notionally committed to liberal-
democratic forms of politics, might revert to illiberalism unless constrained by (European 
and domestic) institutions.   Given the nature of such models, the discourse and ideas of ECE 
actors have remained largely unincorporated into accounts of democratic backsliding. 
‘Discursive institutionalism’ (DI), we suggest, offers a useful corrective to this and a fresh 
perspective on democratic backsliding in ECE, which, despite its unanticipated speed and 
seriousness, has been studied through same set of theoretical frameworks which generated 
earlier accounts of successful democratic consolidation. 
Applied to issues of (de-)consolidation in ECE, DI implies that, even when democratic 
institutions seem well-established, it is ultimately actors that make and constrain 
institutions, not vice versa.  Using the DI framework, we find commitments to liberalism and 
constitutionalism of ostensibly liberal pro-European forces which should be bulwarks 
against backsliding in two ECE states to be circumscribed by a resilient ‘background idea’:  
the national state as property of and instrument for the titular ethnic majority.    In both 
Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, we find influential liberal actors evolving from tacit 
conformity with ethnic exclusivity as a ‘background idea’ to ideational entrepreneurship 
melding liberal and illiberal norms, including open advocacy of ethnically-exclusive norms. In 
the Czech Republic, we even see the beginnings of a novel, Central European social 
democratic discourse blending appeals to social and ethnic solidarity.  For both Bulgarian 




belonging/returning to Europe functions as a means of illiberal exclusion, rather than a 
means of identifying with liberal and democratic values. 
Viewed through the lens of DI, ECE democracies appear more fragile than implied in 
accounts rooted in a view of institutions as incentive structures or lock-in mechanisms but, 
above all, as possessed of different vulnerabilities. Crises (‘exogenous shocks’) and formal 
institutional design, while they matter, matter less and differently than sometimes 
supposed.  Discursive backsliding overlaps with both pre- and post-accession periods and 
falls either side of the Great Recession. Our study thus suggests that illiberal drift cannot be 
read as a mechanical reaction to changing incentives of EU institutions or exogenous shocks 
of recession or refugee crisis: despite stronger mainstream liberal, social democratic 
traditions and weaker impacts of the global recession and refugee crisis, it was Czech (rather 
than Bulgarian) mainstream actors who have innovated most in an illiberal direction.    
Why and how do such weaknesses in the under-examined political mainstream matter? Our 
presentation of discourse on minority rights and cultural pluralism shows movement from 
constrained liberalism to outright illiberalism, but also hints at channels through which a 
fuller illiberal transformation of actors and (consequently) institutions can occur.  Although 
they lack the strong illiberal nationalist parties of Hungary, Poland or the Western Balkans, 
both Bulgaria and the Czech Republic present institutional cracks and conduits through 
which such ‘liberal reformers’  might make power grabs:  the ill-defined prerogatives of the 
Czech president  which enable the appointment of presidential-technocratic governments; 




majoritarian voting system in Bulgaria.10 These might eventually develop into frontal 
assaults on constitutional norms and institutions paralleled by the transformation of liberal 
discourse into overtly illiberal forms echoing Hungary or Poland. However, future research 
must also remain alert to the possibility of slower forms of creeping authoritarianisation, 
abetted or led by transformed parties of the supposed liberal mainstream.  
DI-inspired perspectives can, however, also contribute to understanding cases like Hungary 
and Poland, where the illiberal transformation of democratic institutions is well under way. 
To fully understand such cases, we suggest, it may be important not only to analyse the 
ongoing politics of building ‘illiberal democracy’ and the ideological direction of governing 
parties, but also crucial earlier periods of discursive change: for example, the late 1990s 
when Fidesz evolved from liberalism to conservatism, or the mid-2000s when both Fidesz 
and Poland’s Law and Justice underwent rethinking and radicalisation following electoral 
and political setbacks.  
For European policymakers grappling with the challenges illiberal parties (in the making) 
currently pose, there is bad news and good. The bad news is that an EU strategy, both pre- 
and post-accession, focussing on incentives and institutional constraints may continue to 
prove a bad bet.  The intertwining of identities, ideas and institutions posseted by DI 
suggests that seeking ever more powerful carrot-and-stick mechanisms – such as proposals 
to link structural funds to the domestic rule of law - may be ineffective. Even if they do not 
control them, illiberal and sometimes authoritarian national governments will push against, 
                                                          
10 ‘Bulgarian Parliament rejects at first reading proposal by Borissov’s party for full majoritarian 
electoral system’; Sofia Globe, 17 June 2017.  Available 
http://sofiaglobe.com/2017/06/15/bulgarian-parliament-rejects-at-first-reading-proposal-by-




and through their presence in them subtly transform, European institutions.  This process 
would play out in the type of hybrid EU taking in national democracies and proliferating 
national authoritarianisms that Kelemen (2017) all too plausibly envisages.  
The good news – albeit qualified –  is that a DI perspective implies that apparent loss of 
leverage post-accession may be less the grand failure that conventional rationalist and 
historical institutionalist approaches imply: EU leverage in ECE was (and is) less powerful 
than assumed. Conditionalities succeed in manipulating the incentive structures of 
superficially liberal actors and electorates even while titular nationalist ‘background’ ideas 
set ‘limits of the imaginable’ domestically, sustaining or keeping open the space for an 
illiberal turn. However, illiberal institutional settlements in turn do not constrain or lock in 
actors – and may prove equally changeable as and if conservative nationalist ‘background 
ideas’ are foregrounded. Foreground ideas – publicly advocated and inviting critique – are 
more liable to erode or evolve than background ideas. EU actors should seek out and, when 
they can, lend legitimacy to domestic projects promoting cultural change by re-working 
assumptions about a titular national state. Such tendencies may be found beneath formal 
national organisations in loose “counterpublics” of the kind identified by Dawson (2016). 
Strategies  embracing ideas and identities and ‘hearts and minds’ change may sustain 
(resurgent) liberal democratic institutions better than those narrowly focused on 
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